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judgment.17 In the statement quoted above the court seems to recognize that its
decision is against established precedent and yet it feels justified in making the departure. It is probable that the court felt that the plaintiff had been caught between
two loan companies and deserved relief on whatever theory possible.
Not only does the decision seem to be unjustified on the basis of precedent but in
addition it appears to be contrary to the policy of the Illinois Civil Practice Act by
making a difference between the adequacy of relief available in an action to vacate
8
the judgment and that in the suit for the injunction. Section 44 of the Practice Act
permits a plaintiff to join any cause of action, legal or equitable, and a defendant to
set up any counterclaim, 19 legal or equitable. With reference to the portion of the
opinion quoted above the court states that" .... this distinction [of law and equity]
has not been entirely abrogated by Section 44 of our Civil Practice Act." Under some
codes providing for the union of law and equity the courts have not looked favorably
on such a move but instead have preserved the ancient distinctions and have dismissed
cases for procedural defects which codes were designed in part to eliminate2 ° Dean
Clark, writing shortly after the adoption of the Civil Practice Act, stated that such
anomalous results can be avoided under the new act, but to do so will require" ....
that the Illinois judges will seize on the opportunity afforded by the joinder provisions
to avoid such a result."" Professor McCaskill, however, seems to adopt a view similar
to that of the instant case when he states that, "In developing the one form of civil
action it is well to bear in mind that whatever else may have been abolished, actions
at law and suits in equity still remain, not, it is true, as independent systems of prowhich provides for both. Attempts to obscure this fact
cedure, butt within a system
2
lead only to confusion.""1
Thus by finding a difference between the relief granted in equity and at law the
court is preventing a simplification which the Practice Act is designed to attain and
which other states have achieved by stating in their codes that there shall be but one
civil action.24
Evidence-Constitutional Law-Inability of Wife To Waive Husband's Immunity
to Unreasonable Search and Seizure-[Illinoisj.-Whle the defendant was detained
in police custody on a charge of larceny, the complainant, accompanied by deputy
sheriffs, went to the defendant's home in search of the stolen goods. The defendant's
17 Sherman

v. Daddely, ii Ill. 622 (i85o).
is Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. II0, § 168.
19.01. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. iio, § 162: "Subject to rules, any demand by one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs, or against one or more co-defendants, whether in the
nature of set-off, recoupment, cross-bill in equity or otherwise, and whether in tort or contract,
for liquidated or unliquidated damages, or for other relief, may be pleaded as a cross demand
in any action, and when so pleaded shall be called a counterclaim."
o See Clark, The New Illinois Civil Practice Act, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 209, 211 (i933).
2.td. at 215.
22McCaskill, One Form of Civil Action, But What Procedure for the Federal Courts?
30 Ill. L. Rev. 415 (1935).
' See Fisher, Persistence of Chitty, 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 359 (1939).
24Okla. Stat. 1893, c. 764, § 3882. Black v. Jackson, 177 U.S. 349 (1900).
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wife permitted the men to enter and look about the house and grounds, although they
possessed no search warrant. Upon the objection that the admission of evidence procured as a result of this search was error, held, for the defendant. A wife is not empowered to waive her husband's constitutional immunity to an unreasonable search
and seizure. Peoplev. Lind.'
The immunity to unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed persons by the
state' and federals constitutions may be waived and the objection to a search as unreasonable thus removed.4 Generally, the cases speak of this waiver as a privilege
which is personal and hence one which is capable of being exerted only by the person
who stands accused.s By considering the problem in the light of waiver and personal
privilege, and by assuming that the search was unreasonable, however, the instant
court does not allow the case to turn on its fundamental issue. Were the attention of
the court directed to an inquiry as to whether in fact the search was unreasonable,6 the
function of safeguarding the constitutional guaranty could be performed more efficiently. Unfortunately, "unreasonable" is a term whose meaning the constitutional
proisions do not explain; its definition is left to judicial decision. In arriving at its
conclusion -a court must consider the immediate circumstances and the policies expected to be served by a broad or narrow interpretation.7 A sociological approach,
whereby all existing facts are admitted in evidence, would equip the court with something more than its own empiricism as its guide to a judicious result.' With liberal
rules on the admission of evidence, the number of facts to which the court may advert
in deciding the issue of reasonableness is materially increased. Thus, the court would
have no need to denominate the constitutional immunity a personal privilege and to
admit or exclude evidence according to whether or not the correct person had exerted
the privilege.
In the present case, for the first time in Illinois, there is raised the problem of the
wife of an arrestee consenting to a search of her and her husband's home by persons
'370 Ill. 131, i8 N.E. (2d) 189 (1938).
2Ill. Const., Art. 2. § 6.
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U.S. Const., Amend. 4.

Willis, Constitutional Law, 542 (1936). In People v. Preston, 341 Ill. 407, 173 N.E. 383
(193o), the court said that where one consents to a search of his person, he thereby waives his
constitutional right in that respect. Cf. De Lapp v. United States, 53 F. (2d) 627 (C.C.A. 8th
i931); United States v. Shules, 65 F. (2d) 780 (C.C.A. 2d 1933).
s Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Carignano v. State, 31 Okl. Cr. 228, 238
Pac. 507 (1925); Gilliland v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 453, 6 S.W. (2d) 467 (1928). On the
authority to consent for another to search and seizure, see cases collected in 58 A.L.R. 737
(1929). For a view favoring the doctrine that waiver is personal, see Wood, Scope of Constitutional Immunity against Search and Seizure, 34 W.Va. L. Q. 1, 146 (1927).
6By inquiring directly into the question whether the search was a reasonable one, the court
in Cass v. State, 124 Tex. Cr. 2o8, 61 S.W. (2d) 500 (1933), on facts similar to those of the
instant case, was able to reach an opposite conclusion. The case was criticized in a note, ix
N.Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 466 (1934).
7This note considers the same method of analysis propounded by Waite, Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 623 (1938).
8 The role sociology should play in judicial determinations is discussed in Cardozo, Growth
of the Law, 117-26 (1924).
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not possessing a search warrant.9 Assuming that a wife has the right in this state to
admit people to the family home, and that the wife of the defendant permitted the
complainant and the deputies to enter, 0 it follows that such entry was not an unreasonable one. Consequently, evidence unfavorable to the defendant which is uncovered upon such entry and search is not obtained through illegal methods, violates
no constitutional provision designed for the accused's protection, and should be admitted at the trial. If the circumstances were such that the search was a reasonable
one, it would seem to be superfluous to inquire whether the accused himself bad consented to the search.
In the everlasting conflict between the interest of the community in effective enforcement of the criminal law and the dislike of individuals for police interference with
their activities, there is the question when and to what extent police officers, without a
warrant, may search for evidence of crime.- Perhaps a workable rule would inquire
into the conditions under which the search was made; if someone of authority consented to the search, the constitutional requirement is satisfied.
Landlord and Tenant-Distress for Rent-[Illinois].-The plaintiff leased a store
from the defendant and furnished it with barber shop fixtures. He became delinquent
in payment of the rent and, upon the defendant's refusal to accept the plaintiff's tender
of a substantial portion of the amount due, relinquished possession of the premises by
returning his key. Thereupon the defendant entered and undertook the operation of
the shop, using the fixtures which the plaintiff had not removed. A distress warrant
was issued by the defendant but not levied. In an action to recover the fixtures and
damages for their wrongful detention, held, for the plaintiff. The distress warrant not
having been levied, the defendant-landlord had no right to detain or use the plaintiff's
fixtures. Cottrellv. Gerson.'
The instant case is noteworthy because it contains an excellent discussion of distress
in Illinois. A landlord in Illinois has a statutory right to distrain for rent 2 and a statutory lien on crops. 3 These statutes are modifications of and additions to the landlord's
right to distrain available at common law.4 To reach the tenant's personal property
for the purpose of holding it as security for the rent due or for the purpose of obtaining
payment of the rent from the proceeds of a sale of the property, the landlord is authorized to seize "any personal property of his tenant that may be found in the county
where such tenant shall reside."'s At common law the landlord could seize any personal
9The majority of the cases on this point have been decided in favor of the husband-defendant. In Cofer v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 677 (C.C.A. 5th 1930), the court said that "the wife
was without authority to bind her absent husband by waiving a legal warrant, or consenting to
an unauthorized search." The court in Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921), intimated
that were the point before the court it would have been decided adversely to the prosecution.
Contra, Cass v. State, 124 Tex. Ct. 208, 61 S.W. (ad) 5oo (1933).
10There is no consent to search where entry is permitted under coercion, actual or implied.
Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); see Cornelius, Search and Seizure § i6 (1926).
" An illuminating discussion of this problem is made by Professor Waite, op. cit. supra
note 7.
* 296 Ill.
App. 412, 16 N.E. (2d) 529 (938).
*Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1937, C.8o, § 16.
4Hadden v. Knickerbocker, 70 Ill.
677 (1873).
3Id. at §31.
sIll. Rev. Stat. x937, c. 8o, § 16.

